Sandboxed surfaces

This is a guide, not the contract. What the platform guarantees is specified under openspec/specs/. For this page: plugin-sandbox · surfaces. Where this page and a specification disagree, the specification is right, and that is a defect in this page: change the behaviour there, then explain it here.

A sandboxed surface is an iframe the host mounts in isolation, which is how a plugin written in any technology contributes a view. This page declares one, routable or docked, shows how a sandboxed plugin gets its ctx, and introduces the frame UI kit its surfaces paint with. It closes with what a plugin needs once a store distributes it: an honest capability declaration, a monotonic version and data-only settings.

Presentation: `component` or `iframe`

A surface renders either from an Angular component (the trusted, in-process form, see The content area) or from an iframe URL. That choice is independent of whether a URL points at the surface:

ctx.registerSurface({ id: 'report', title: 'report.title', iframe: '/my-plugin/report.html',
  routable: { path: 'report/:id' } });

The iframe form is how a sandboxed, non-Angular plugin contributes a content view: the host mounts the URL in an isolated <iframe sandbox> (own JS context, no host access). A plain string, it serialises across the ctx-RPC boundary, unlike an Angular class. For a sandboxed plugin the URL must be same-origin (served by the distribution, like the plugin itself). A foreign origin, javascript: or data: URL is rejected at the RPC seam, so an untrusted plugin cannot point the host chrome wherever it likes. A sandboxed surface may be docked (docks) as well as routable, and it may declare a container. A sandboxed surface carries no actions: the seam keeps id, title, icon, badge, order and the docking fields and drops the rest, so the panel header draws no actions for it and ctx.updateSurfaceAction has nothing there to replace. The seam rejects access instead of silently dropping it, because a sandboxed surface gates itself from the session state the host pushes. A trusted plugin may use the same iframe form to embed a foreign origin on purpose (a dashboard, a docs site, a video). There the distribution decides what may be framed through its CSP frame-src, which the browser enforces. The tab strip works identically, since it only sees the path. This is the first sandbox rung; see building a distribution for wiring a sandboxed plugin, and Capabilities and trust for the isolation model. Trusted in-process weavers keep using component.

An iframe surface is a first-class content view: the host gives it a small two-way channel (Penpal). The host pushes the active UI language, the active sub-route segment, the preview state, and the resolved light/dark theme. A sandboxed iframe has none of the host’s --lw-* tokens, so the host also pushes the full resolved --lw-* token values plus the root font size. Apply them with LwFrame.applySurfaceState (see The frame UI kit). With this the surface can localise, reflect its own level-2 sub-tabs and match the theme without reloading; the surface can call back navigate('<path>') to drive the router, so its sub-tabs are shareable and browser-navigable. Surface navigation is confined to the route’s own tab root (its sub-routes). The surface channel carries no capability grant, so anything beyond the plugin’s own view goes through the plugin (logic) channel’s ctx.navigateContent (the navigation capability). The channel is opt-in: a static iframe that never connects just renders. (A worked example ships in the testbed’s sandbox-rpc plugin.)

A docked iframe surface

The same iframe form works at a dock, so a surface that is not routable can still be an iframe:

ctx.registerSurface({ id: 'notes.frame', title: 'notes.frame.title',
  docks: ['right-panel'], iframe: '/my-plugin/panel.html' });

It receives the same pushed state, with two differences that follow from having no address. Its tab is always empty, because there is no tab root and no sub-route to reflect. And navigate is a no-op with a development warning rather than an error: the channel is only safe because it is confined to the surface’s own tab root, and a docked surface has none. To move the user somewhere, go through the plugin channel’s ctx.navigateContent (the navigation grant). The pushed state also carries an instanceId: the pane or named instance this mount belongs to, so two mounts of the same surface can keep their own per-instance data apart. It carries params as well: the route params for a routable surface, and the container’s :id for a container child, which is how an iframe child learns which container it is inside. A component child injects the same values off its route.

The sandbox bootstrap — how a sandboxed plugin gets `ctx`

A sandboxed plugin is two documents, and knowing which is which is half the model:

the entry (logic) document is the entryUrl the distribution composes or the catalogue lists. The host loads it in a hidden sandboxed iframe; it never renders. Its whole job is the Penpal handshake: connect to the parent, receive ctx, make your registrations.
the view (surface) document(s) are the iframe: URL(s) your registerSurface calls point at. These are the visible surfaces; they load the frame UI kit below and receive pushed state (render) instead of holding a ctx.

A complete, working entry document (this is the in-repo sandbox-rpc plugin, trimmed):

<!-- plugin.html — the entryUrl document; loads the transport, then your logic -->
<!doctype html>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<script src="/frame-kit/penpal.global.js"></script>
<script src="/my-plugin/plugin.js"></script>

// plugin.js — handshake with the host, then register through the RPC ctx
const messenger = new Penpal.WindowMessenger({
  remoteWindow: globalThis.parent,
  allowedOrigins: ['*'], // the sandboxed iframe has an opaque origin; isolation comes from the sandbox attribute
});

Penpal.connect({ messenger })
  .promise.then((ctx) =>
    Promise.all([
      ctx.toast({ message: 'Hello from the sandbox', kind: 'success', timeoutMs: 4000 }),
      ctx.registerSurface({
        id: 'my-plugin.view',
        title: 'My view',
        iframe: '/my-plugin/view.html', // same-origin — the visible surface document
        routable: { path: 'my-plugin' },
      }),
    ]),
  )
  .catch((error) => console.error('[my-plugin] activation failed', error));

The RPC ctx is flat: unlike the in-process ctx the other how-to pages use, there is no ctx.ui facade. Its surface endpoints are registerSurface · retitleSurface · updateSurfaceBadge · setChildShown · registerMenuItem · registerSettingsSection. Its content endpoints are navigateContent · openContentTab / keepContentTab / pinContentTab / unpinContentTab / closeContentTab / updateContentTab · revealSurface. The rest are invokeCommand / invocableCommands · toast, and stateWatch / stateSet / stateClear / stateUnwatch for plugin state. Every call runs through the same default-deny capability broker as a trusted plugin. An ungranted capability rejects, so .catch and degrade. (Generate this whole layout with nx g @loomweaver/devkit:frame-plugin or the MCP scaffold_frame_plugin, described in scaffolding.)

The frame UI kit

A sandboxed surface (the view document) does not import @loomweaver/shell. Instead the distribution serves the frame UI kit (@loomweaver/frame-kit) same-origin under the well-known path /frame-kit/, and your surface references it:

<link rel="stylesheet" href="/frame-kit/lw-frame.css" />
<script src="/frame-kit/penpal.global.js"></script>
<script src="/frame-kit/lw-elements.global.js"></script>

lw-elements.global.js defines the whole <lw-*> element family with the built-in icon set seeded, from the same element list and behaviour source the host runs. The family is lw-icon · lw-tooltip · lw-select/lw-option · lw-nav-tree/lw-nav-group/lw-nav-item · lw-menu/lw-menu-item · lw-markdown · lw-button · lw-progress-ring · lw-spinner. It also exposes globalThis.LwFrame: setIcon(name, svg) / removeIcon / hasIcon for plugin-own icons (sanitised), and applySurfaceState(state). Call that one from your render handler and the pushed tokens, root font size and light/dark theme are applied for you.
lw-frame.css is the host’s .lw-* class contract compiled to plain CSS on var(--lw-*) (with light/dark fallbacks for the blink before the first push), so there is no hand-kept CSS mirror.
penpal.global.js is the RPC transport (globalThis.Penpal).

The kit is versioned with the distribution’s shell: you reference it, you do not vendor it, so your paint always matches the host the plugin actually runs in. For development outside a distribution, copy the files from the @loomweaver/frame-kit npm package.

Writing the surface in TypeScript

The package ships dist/lw-frame.d.ts, a description of the global the script installs. It is an ambient declaration rather than a module, because you load the kit with a <script> tag and never import it. So you reference it once and LwFrame is typed everywhere:

{ "compilerOptions": { "types": ["@loomweaver/frame-kit"] } }

A wrong method name or a wrong argument is then reported while you write it, instead of failing as undefined is not a function inside a frame you cannot easily inspect. Nothing about the surface changes: plain HTML with a script tag stays exactly as valid, and the declaration is emitted from the same source the bundle is built from, so the two cannot disagree. What it describes:

LwFrameApi is the shape of globalThis.LwFrame itself: the icon methods, applySurfaceState, connectState and the state store.
LwSurfaceRenderState is what the host pushes to your render handler: theme, design tokens, root font size and the product’s replacement glyphs. Hand it to applySurfaceState unchanged.
LwStateApi is the surface half of ctx.state: watch(key) for a handle, and apply(...) to feed the host’s stateChanged push in from your methods.
LwStateHandle is one key’s handle: value · loaded · set · clear · dispose, plus onChange so you can re-render. It mirrors what a trusted plugin holds, so the store reads the same on both rungs of the isolation ladder.
LwStateHost is the set of host methods your Penpal connection exposes for the store. You pass the resolved connection to connectState; you do not call these yourself.
LwSurfaceCapture / LwSurfaceCaptureRequest are what the workbench asks for and what you answer with when it draws a picture of itself, described next.

A picture of the workbench, and your part in it

A product can ask the workbench to draw a picture of what the user is seeing, usually for a fault report. The browser will not photograph a tab without asking the user’s permission and making them pick a target every time, so the picture is rendered from the document instead. That stops at your surface: it is isolated, so nothing outside it may read what it drew. The workbench therefore asks your surface to draw itself.

Expose the platform’s own methods beside yours and this happens for you:

Penpal.connect({
  messenger,
  methods: LwFrame.surfaceMethods({
    render(state) {
      LwFrame.applySurfaceState(state);
    },
  }),
});

surfaceMethods returns your methods plus the ones the workbench may call on any surface. Write it this way and requests added to the platform later arrive without you editing the plugin again. The platform’s own names win over yours, so you cannot shadow one by accident. A surface that does not expose them is not broken. It simply appears on the picture as an area saying its content is not included.

The renderer is fetched from beside the kit the first time a picture is asked for, so a surface that is never captured never pays for it.

Keeping something off the picture

Mark any element and its content stays off every picture; the area says so instead:

<p data-lw-withhold>Account 8812 3345 9901</p>

It is read at the moment a picture is made, so setting or clearing it takes effect at once, and your surface is never told that it is being pictured. There is no moment at which it could behave differently because it is being observed, which is the whole point of a fault report.

You cannot refuse to be pictured, and marking your root does nothing. The user is already looking at those pixels and can photograph the screen by other means. A refusal would withhold nothing from them, while making the feature useless for the case it exists for: reporting a fault in a plugin. What you can do is keep particular content out, which is what the marking is for.

What is not on the picture at all: content scrolled out of sight inside a region, and any surface the user opened in its own window. The picture is what the user could see. And because it is drawn rather than photographed, it is a faithful depiction rather than an exact one, and a surface that paints by means that cannot be re-rendered may differ from the screen.

Distributing through a plugin store

A sandboxed plugin needs nothing extra to be store-installable: a distribution lists it in its plugin catalogue (id, entry URL, display metadata) and users install it at runtime. Two things matter to you as the author. First, declare your capabilities honestly. The install dialog shows exactly the declared set to the user, and accepting grants exactly that. An undeclared capability is never granted; a declared one the user can still revoke later. Second, expect your files to be copied into the product’s own origin. The store is same-origin by design, so getting listed means passing the operator’s review, not hosting anything yourself. Ship a README.md with your plugin: the operator copies it into the store next to your files and the store’s detail pane renders it in-app. It is your plugin’s storefront page. (The testbed’s store-full plugin is the worked example.)

Shipping a new version

Updates ride on the catalogue’s version field: the operator raises it together with your files, and every installed user is offered an update that swaps the entry and respawns your plugin live. Two consequences for you. Keep the version monotonic: segments are compared numerically, 1.10.0 beats 1.9.0, and only a strictly newer version is offered. And a version which declares capabilities the user never consented to asks for consent again, listing exactly the added ones, so growing your declaration is safe but never silent.

Settings: declare data, the host renders and stores

A sandboxed plugin can contribute a settings section over RPC, but in a data-only form. Each row declares a control kind and its default value instead of value()/set() callbacks, which cannot cross the wire. The host renders the controls. It also owns the storage (user-local through the distribution’s settings store). It pushes the current values back by calling the settingsChanged(sectionId, values) method you expose on your RPC channel. That call comes once after registration with the restored state, then on every change, including a change made in another browser window. Plugin settings ride the shell’s cross-tab sync, so every window’s copy stays current; there is nothing to wire. Labels may be plain literals (you cannot contribute translations). The host decides where your section appears: an installed plugin’s section lands under the “Community plugins” nav group, a composed frame plugin’s under “App plugins”. The group is never your choice, so nothing can masquerade as the app.

ctx.registerSettingsSection({
  id: 'prefs',
  title: 'My plugin',
  rows: [
    { id: 'greeting', label: 'Greeting', control: { kind: 'text', value: 'Hello' } },
    { id: 'loud', label: 'Shout', control: { kind: 'toggle', value: false } },
    // also: { kind: 'select', value, options: [{ value, label }] } · { kind: 'slider', value, min?, max?, step? }
  ],
});

The host calls the settingsChanged method you expose on your side of the bootstrap handshake:

Penpal.connect({
  messenger,
  methods: {
    settingsChanged(sectionId, values) {
      // called once with the restored state after registration, then on every change
    },
  },
});

Where next

Frame plugins: how a distribution composes a sandboxed plugin and serves the kit.
Plugin store: the catalogue, runtime install and updates on the operator’s side.
Your plugin’s own store: the store both documents of a sandboxed plugin share.